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FROM BIBLES TO BIOMARKERS: THE FUTURE OF THE DSM AND 
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS 
 
Teneille R. Brown* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual on Mental Disorders (DSM) represents 
the current thinking on the symptomology of mental illness, from the perspective of 
the American Psychiatric Association. The most recent version, DSM-5, was 
published in May 2013 after nearly two decades of research and a highly politicized 
revision process.1 Intended primarily as an aid in the diagnosis and treatment of 
mental illness, the uses of the DSM have spilled over into research. The DSM has 
also become the de facto guide for forensic psychiatry.2 Despite the strong language 
in the introduction to the DSM that advises otherwise, “the DSM is now regularly 
used unadulterated in forensic contexts . . . .”3  
Having researched how judges sentence psychopaths in the past, it was curious 
to me that some judges would ignore any evidence of psychopathy, whether 
presented by the defense or the prosecution, because the diagnosis of psychopathy 
is not in the DSM.4 Despite the fact there is a validated diagnostic tool for 
                                                     
* © 2015 Teneille R. Brown. Professor Brown is a faculty member at the University of 
Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law and an adjunct professor of Internal Medicine at the 
University of Utah. Professor Brown organized and presented at the November 7, 2014, Utah 
Law Review Symposium, Legal Borders and Mental Disorders: The Challenge of Defining 
Mental Illness. This research was made possible in part through generous support from the 
Albert and Elaine Borchard Fund for Faculty Excellence. 
1 While not the focus of this paper, the authors of the DSM-5 were accused of having 
financial ties to the pharmaceutical industry, lacking transparency, and not being open to the 
criticisms of outsiders. Roger Collier, DSM Revision Surrounded by Controversy, 182 
CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 16, 16–17 (2010). See also Lisa Cosgrove & Sheldon Krimsky, A 
Comparison of DSM-IV and DSM-5 Panel Members’ Financial Associations with Industry: 
A Pernicious Problem Persists, 9 PLOS MED. 1, 1 (2012) (“[I]ndustry relationships persist 
despite increased transparency. Currently, 69% of the DSM-5 task force members report 
having ties to the pharmaceutical industry.”); Ron Grossman, Psychiatry Manual’s Secrecy 
Criticized, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/dec/29/nation/na-
mental-disorders29, archived at http://perma.cc/H6FC-PJ3F. 
2 Daniel W. Shuman, Softened Science in the Courtroom: Forensic Implications of a 
Value-Laden Classification, in DESCRIPTIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS: VALUES, MENTAL 
DISORDERS, AND THE DSMS 217, 218 (John Z. Sadler ed., 2002) (“[t]he DSM has not only 
become a staple presence of civil and criminal litigation, it has transformed that litigation as 
well. For example, the recognition of the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder in the 
DSM-III transformed tort litigation resulting in a host of new claims tied to the diagnosis.”). 
3 Id. 
4 See Robert D. Hare et al., Psychopathy and the DSM-IV Criteria for Antisocial 
Personality Disorder, 100 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 391, 392–93 (1991) (“The lack of 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2977425 
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psychopathy, the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), the PCL-R is not 
incorporated verbatim into the DSM, so to many judges and legal scholars, the 
diagnosis is not “real.”5 This observation is troubling. Reliable labels are useful for 
mental illness diagnosis, and to a lesser extent to guide our legal decisions. Even so, 
and despite its clinical utility, it seems that judges and lawyers are being far too 
deferential to the DSM—to the exclusion of everything else. 
To be sure, many legal rights and procedures hinge on whether the individual 
has a disorder that is recognized by the DSM.6 Convicts are executed7 and 
committed,8 custody battles are lost,9 disability benefits are awarded,10 children are 
                                                     
congruence between the DSM–III–R criteria for APD [antisocial personality disorder] and 
other well-established conceptions of psychopathy does not appear to have been intentional. 
Rather, this construct drift seems to have been the unforeseen result of reliance on a fixed . . 
. set of behavioral indicators in the DSM–III and the DSM–III–R. That is, the behavioral 
indicators do not provide adequate coverage of the construct they were designed to measure 
. . . . Criticisms of the DSM–III–R criteria for APD would be moot if there were no viable 
alternatives available. Over the last 10 years, however, a great deal of empirical evidence 
indicates that at least one viable alternative does exist—the PCL–R.”); Donald R. Lynam & 
David D. Vachon, Antisocial Personality Disorder in DSM-5: Missteps and Missed 
Opportunities, 3 PERSONALITY DISORDERS: THEORY, RES., & TREATMENT 483, 489 (2012). 
5 Notably, Law Professor Deborah Denno questions why my co-authors and I used the 
“diagnosis” of psychopathy, when it is not recognized by the medical community, as 
expressed through its omission from the DSM. As she puts it, “the DSM is still considered a 
mainstay of the classification of psychiatric disorders, ‘the Bible of psychiatry, providing a 
scriptural basis for the profession.’” Deborah W. Denno, What Real-World Criminal Cases 
Tell Us About Genetics Evidence, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1591, 1596–97 (2013) (quoting GARY 
GREENBERG, THE BOOK OF WOE: THE DSM AND THE UNMAKING OF PSYCHIATRY 15 
(2013)). 
6 “[T]he DSM is regularly relied upon by attorneys and referenced by courts in judicial 
proceedings. In fact, many state and federal statutes include definitions of mental illnesses 
based specifically on the diagnostic guidelines found in the DSM for use in both civil and 
criminal proceedings.” Cia Bearden, The Reality of the DSM in the Legal Arena: A 
Proposition for Curtailing Undesired Consequences of an Imperfect Tool, 13 HOUS. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 79, 80 (2012) (citations omitted). 
7 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3, 309 (2002), construed in Thomas v. Allen, 
614 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262–63 (N.D. Ala. 2009), aff’d, 607 F.3d 749 (11th Cir. 2010). 
8 See People v. Felix, 169 Cal. App. 4th 607, 614–15 (2008) (discussing how the DSM 
terminology generally determines the outcome of civil commitment proceedings); In re Det. 
of New, 21 N.E.3d 406, 411 (Ill. 2014) (discussing how revisions to the DSM may impact 
the civil commitment of sexually violent predators). 
9 While not always clearly dispositive, courts rely heavily on whether a diagnosis is 
contained in the DSM when deciding expert testimony admissibility in custody battles. See 
Zafran v. Zafran, 740 N.Y.S.2d 596, 598 (2002); see also Matt Stroud, Is the New ‘Bible of 
Psychiatry’ a Weapon for the Courts?, THE VERGE (May 28, 2013, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2013/5/28/4370328/legally-unsound-a-book-meant-to-assist-
doctors-becomes-a-weapon-in, archived at http://perma.cc/4PDE-D7XA. 
10 See Brown v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 948 F.2d 268, 270 (6th Cir. 1991). 
2015] FROM BIBLES TO BIOMARKERS 745 
denied educational accommodations,11 and insurance benefits are refused12 based 
upon the criteria contained in the DSM. It is difficult to overstate its prevalence and 
“linguistic dominance” in legal proceedings.13 As of 2014, the DSM has been cited 
in over 10,000 court cases and about 430 statutes.14 The regular reference to the 
DSM is particularly disturbing given that the DSM-5 has now expanded to include 
behaviors that were previously considered within the range of normal experience, 
such as bereavement15 and childhood defiance.16 At one time the DSM also included 
the diagnosis of homosexuality.17 As the editor of an earlier version stated when 
                                                     
11 See Jaffess v. Council Rock Sch. Dist., Civil Action No. 06-0143, 2006 WL 3097939, 
at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2006) (“As to HJ’s purported learning disabilities, Dr. Lamberth 
stressed that: (1) the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) does 
not include a non-verbal learning disability among possible disorders . . . .”); see also Roe v. 
Nevada, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1048–49 (D. Nev. 2007). 
12 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-488b (West 2012) (requiring that health insurance 
plans provide coverage for autism treatments, as autism is defined by the DSM). This will 
impact people previously diagnosed with Asperger’s disorder, who now may “fall outside of 
DSM-5 severity thresholds for receiving state-funded, school-supported, and/or insurance-
covered services for their developmental, social, and communication deficiencies.” Kristine 
M. Kulage et al., How Will DSM-5 Affect Autism Diagnosis? A Systematic Literature Review 
and Meta-analysis, 44 J. AUTISM DEV. DISORDER 1918, 1930 (2014). Most states do not 
require parity between health insurance coverage of mental and physical illnesses. In many 
states, like Kansas, even where statutes are passed that require parity in health insurance 
coverage between mental and physical illness, the statutes limit coverage to those diagnoses 
that are included in the DSM. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2,105a (West 2008); NAT’L 
ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, MENTAL HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: A GUIDE TO 
STATE PARITY LAW 3–4, available at http://www.nami.org/Content/ContentGroups/Policy/ 
Issues_Spotlights/Parity1/Mental_Health_Insurance_Coverage_A_Guide_to_State_Parity_
Law1.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/F5BV-B8RD (last visited Jan. 27, 2015). 
13 “As partial custodians of the state’s police power, mental health professionals may 
separate parents from their children through expert testimony in custody hearings or may 
deprive persons of physical liberty through the process of involuntary commitment. As their 
‘special language’ for communicating about mental disorders . . . , the DSM-III also confers 
upon professionals the power of linguistic dominance, serving as a private communication 
mode that helps to preserve and promote acceptance of their beliefs and value systems.” 
Thomas E. Schact, DSM-III and the Politics of Truth, 40 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 513, 514 (1985) 
(citation omitted). 
14 This is based on a Westlaw search requiring the use of “Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual” using all states and all federal cases and statutes. 
15 Jerome C. Wakefield & Michael B. First, Validity of the Bereavement Exclusion to 
Major Depression: Does the Empirical Evidence Support the Proposal to Eliminate the 
Exclusion in DSM-5?, 11 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 3, 3 (2012). 
16 Robert R. Althoff et al., Classes of Oppositional-Defiant Behavior: Concurrent and 
Predictive Validity, 55 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 1162, 1162–63 (2014). 
17 Consider also, for example, the oft-cited example of homosexuality being inserted 
and then removed from the DSM since the DMS-I. It once was considered deviant enough 
of sexual behavior to count as a mental illness, but now, under the DSM, it no longer fits the 
definition of mentally disordered. For a thorough discussion of the many ways that values 
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discussing the DSM-5, “[t]he history of psychiatry is littered with fad diagnoses that 
in retrospect did far more harm than good.”18  
Given its importance to the law, it is regrettable that judges and lawyers do not 
fully understand how the DSM is constructed, and the bedrock of values on which 
it rests.19 As evidence of this, lawyers and judges often refer to the DSM as the 
“psychiatric bible.”20 This language is both fascinating and perplexing. It is 
fascinating because the metaphor of the bible commands reverence. It suggests that 
therapists treat the DSM as a canonical text, akin to the way American lawyers treat 
the U.S. Constitution. The metaphor is perplexing because it confers faith-based 
power on a document that is not only completely unsacred to psychotherapists,21 but 
indeed is so regularly criticized in its production, content, and philosophy that its 
criticisms have become cliché.22  
                                                     
and cultural biases are incorporated into the DSM, see Thomas A. Widiger, Values, Politics, 
and Science in the Construction of the DSMs, in DESCRIPTIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS: 
VALUES, MENTAL DISORDERS, AND THE DSMS 25, 29 (John Z. Sadler ed., 2002). 
18 Allen J. Frances, DSM 5 Is Guide, Not a Bible—Ignore Its Ten Worst Changes, 
PSYCHOL. TODAY (Dec. 2, 2012), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/dsm5-in-
distress/201212/dsm-5-is-guide-not-bible-ignore-its-ten-worst-changes, archived at 
https://perma.cc/4HVD-45HY. 
19 The DSM has been challenged for being sexist as well as representing hegemony. 
See Marcie Kaplan, A Woman’s View of DSM-III, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 786, 788–91 
(1983) (arguing that a contributor to sex differences in mental illness treatment rates is the 
DSM-III); Janet M. Stoppard, Sexism and the DSM-III-R, 32 CANADIAN PSYCHOL. 148, 148–
50 (1991) (stating that recognizing certain disorders would redress the sexist bias of the 
DSM-III-R); see also Shuman, supra note 2, at 217–18 (explaining that the DSM has become 
a staple in civil and criminal litigation). 
20 “The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (aka ‘DSM’) is the 
mental health field’s diagnostic bible. Like the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment . . . , the DSM is received in courts as black letter truth.” Warren Moïse, Shrink 
Rap, 20 S.C. LAW., Mar. 2009, at 13, 13. 
21 According to Dr. Vivek Datta, “It is an open secret that most psychiatrists do not [use 
the DSM]!” Vivek Datta, Does DSM-5 Matter? Yes, but not to Psychiatrists., MED. & SOC’Y 
BLOG (May 13, 2013, 12:40 AM), http://canardtheduck.blogspot.com/2013/05/does-dsm-5-
matter-yes-but-not-to.html, archived at http://perma.cc/BBE9-JS7M. See also Mark 
Zimmerman & Janine Galione, Psychiatrists’ and Nonpsychiatrist Physicians’ Reported Use 
of the DSM-IV Criteria for Major Depressive Disorder, 71 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 235, 
235–36 (2010) (reporting that nearly one-quarter of the psychiatrists indicated that they 
usually did not use the DSM-IV major depressive disorder criteria when diagnosing 
depression). 
22 See Schacht, supra note 13, at 520 (arguing for a position that permits fuller 
recognition of the scientific and political complexities of the DSM, instead of political attack 
rhetoric); Arthur Caplan, Viewpoint: Stop Critiquing the DSM 5, TIME (May 21, 2013), 
http://ideas.time.com/2013/05/21/viewpoint-stop-critiquing-the-dsm-5/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/EKV3-5SDW (“Not since the critics uniformly declared Adam Sandler’s 
Jack and Jill ‘the worst movie ever made’ long before it actually was shown in a theater has 
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Part II of this Article will attempt to correct the notion that the DSM is a legal 
“psychiatric bible” by explaining how it is created and used by the medical field. 
Parts III and IV will also provide a few reasons why the law may have come to view 
it as a “bible.” This is the primary focus of this article. Parts V and VI consider the 
future of psychiatric diagnosis, and describe an alternative to the DSM, empowered 
by a new research tool called the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC). While the DSM 
may be an imperfect legal tool, this Article calls for a more nuanced application of 
its diagnoses rather than abandoning it whole cloth in favor of the RDoC, or any 
other singular diagnostic criteria. 
 
II.  THE DSM IS NOT A BIBLE, BUT A DICTIONARY 
 
As a threshold matter, the entire idea of what counts as a mental illness is one 
that is not obvious or self-revealing.23 Should behavior be classified as characteristic 
of mental illness if it impairs important and complex functions, such as thinking and 
feeling? Is it behavior that falls below an arbitrary, yet statistically-driven 
measurement of normal (i.e., anyone two standard deviations below the mean of a 
distributional function)? Is it behavior that is antisocial, and therefore morally 
judged? Or should it be determined without reference to behavior, based solely on 
underlying dysfunction in brain circuits and genetic mutations? Most psychologists 
are committed to definitions of mental illness that focus on abnormal behavioral 
impairment.24 Even so, the subjective assessment of which behaviors count as 
normal and which are disordered is inescapable. This same conundrum exists at the 
opposite end of the spectrum when one attempts to distinguish treatment of mental 
illness from enhancement. When is a legitimate illness being treated (Adderall for 
attention disorders), and when are people being catapulted to be above average 
(Adderall for cognitive enhancement)? These judgment-calls depend greatly on an 
underlying baseline of what “counts” as disordered.  
                                                     
something not yet put out in public gotten such full-throated critical panning.”); Frances, 
supra note 18 (advising practitioners not to blindly follow the DSM-5). 
23 See Allyson Skene, Rethinking Normativism in Psychiatric Classification, in 
DESCRIPTIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS: VALUES, MENTAL DISORDERS, AND THE DSMS 114, 114 
(John Z. Sadler ed., 2002) (“At the most general level, terms that describe the domain of 
psychopathology, such as disorder, dysfunction, and impairment, connote specific values. A 
more specific example would be personality disorder, which is defined as an ‘enduring 
pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the 
individual’s culture.’”) (citation omitted); Laurence J. Kirmayer & Daina Crafa, What Kind 
of Science for Psychiatry?, 8 FRONTIERS HUM. NEUROSCIENCE 435, 435 (2014) (discussing 
the current psychiatric issues of understanding mental disorders). 
24 See Mental Health Basics, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/mentalhealth/basics.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/7XKH-HCUE 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2015). Indeed, the law is chiefly concerned with behavior as well. Laws 
regulate people, not brains. If a defect exists in the brain or genes, and there is no 
corresponding behavioral deficit, then there is a strong claim to be made that the defect is 
irrelevant to the law. 
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Importantly, the DSM manual is based on the consensus of a small group of 
psychiatrists (not psychologists, psychotherapists, or social workers).25 It necessarily 
reflects the social norms and research agendas of this group, and much has been 
written on the cultural values that underscore the DSM. What is obvious to 
psychiatrists may not be obvious to lawyers: the authors of the DSM bring their 
personal beliefs to the publication process, and may have very different ideas of 
which factors to include in diagnosing mental illness.26  
The DSM provides one important and useful perspective on what counts as 
mentally disordered. However, ultimately for the law this is not a question that 
science or data can answer. Because criminal defenses of insanity receive so much 
media attention, it must be acknowledged that the DSM contains no reference to 
legal insanity. At first blush, this might suggest that in capital cases, when the 
reliance on psychiatric testimony might matter most to save someone’s life from 
execution, the DSM is silent. This supposition would be incorrect. While tempting 
to conflate legal and medical definitions of mental illness, the definition of legal 
insanity, as interpreted through the M’Naughten Test27 or Model Penal Code28 is not 
a psychological construct.29 Psychologists do not diagnose patients as “insane,” and 
                                                     
25 The DSM is published by the American Psychiatric Association under the direction 
of a group of its task force members. See Frequently Asked Questions, AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/about/pages/faq.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/KR8Z-
FURX (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). 
26 John Z. Sadler, Introduction, in DESCRIPTIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS: VALUES, 
MENTAL DISORDERS, AND THE DSMS 3, 3–8 (John Sadler Z. ed., 2002); see also Kenneth 
W.M. Fulford et al., Looking with Both Eyes Open: Fact and Value in Psychiatric 
Diagnosis?, 4 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 78, 78 (2005) (“[A]s early as the fourth century BC, 
mental health, in Plato’s Republic, had both medical and moral aspects . . . . [M]ental disorder 
has shifted this way and that across the medical-moral boundary, and in both Christian and 
Islamic culture, ever since.”). 
27 The most common test for criminal insanity is the M’Naghten “right-wrong” test. To 
prove legal insanity, the test requires that the defendant be suffering from a mental disorder 
that he did not “know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it that 
he did not know he was doing what was wrong.” 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE 
CRIMINAL LAW § 7.2 (West Group ed., 2d ed. 2003). 
28 Under the Model Penal Code test for insanity, a defendant is not legally responsible 
if at the time of his criminal conduct, and “as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks 
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.” 2 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S 
CRIMINAL LAW § 104 (15th ed. 1994). The first section of the Model Penal Code test “‘is 
really only a summary of the whole of M’Naghten in more comprehensive terms.’” Id. 
(citations omitted). 
29 See also Bonnifield v. Lewis, No. C12–3857 PJH (PR), 2014 WL 1101658, at *8 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014) (“‘[T]here’s a substantial difference between someone who’s 
medically insane and someone who’s legally insane.’”) (citation omitted); State v. Silman, 
663 So. 2d 27, 34–35 (La. 1995) (“[B]y the [American Psychiatric Association’s] own 
principles, a person clinically diagnosed with a particular mental disorder does not in itself 
determine that the person was legally insane at the time the crimes were committed . . . the 
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“insanity” appears nowhere in the DSM.30 Even so, criminal defendants do rely on 
psychiatric testimony of particular DSM diagnoses, usually schizophrenia or 
dissociative personality (so-called, “split personality”), to argue that their diagnosis 
and related symptoms render them legally insane or incapable of forming the 
specific intent to kill.31 
The DSM is a helpful aid in the diagnosis of everything from depression and 
anxiety to organic brain disease and autism. The manual is organized to aid in 
reliable diagnosis in an iterative way, meaning that the therapist and the patient can 
“try out” different diagnoses and see which seems to fit. The DSM privileges 
reliability over validity, meaning that its aim is to make sure mental health specialists 
are using the same terms to describe similar constellations of traits.32 At the moment, 
the DSM does not address whether anxiety disorder is completely separate from 
depression in etiology or cause—i.e., whether the constructs are valid and separate 
from one another. While a few disorders are presented in the DSM as existing on a 
continuum, such as the Autism Spectrum Disorder, most diagnoses are considered 
justified in a binary way (present, not present) if a patient meets a specified number 
of listed criteria.33  
Importantly, the DSM diagnoses do not represent validated “theories” of mental 
illness. Diagnoses such as autism, gambling disorder, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, and narcissism are not theories, but labels. Both for questions related to 
                                                     
issue before this court is not whether defendant suffered from a particular psychiatric 
personality disorder, but rather whether the defendant was able to distinguish right from 
wrong at the time of the offenses.”). 
30 See Mark P. Goodman, The Right to A Partisan Psychiatric Expert: Might Indigency 
Preclude Insanity?, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 717–18 (1986) (explaining that psychiatrists 
outside the legal context are not asked to determine whether a person is sane or insane). 
31 The latter, while technically a means of poking holes in the prosecution’s ability to 
prove mens rea, is often discussed alongside insanity defenses. For an overview of how 
claims of legal insanity have relied on DSM diagnoses, see, for example, Weaver v. 
Chappell, No. 1:02–cv–05583 AWI, 2014 WL 1232208, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2014); 
United States ex rel. Bradford v. Gilmore, No. 98 C 1593, 2000 WL 549489, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 
May 1, 2000); People v. Coddington, 2 P.3d 1081, 1110–11 (Cal. 2000); People v. Skinner, 
704 P.2d 752, 763 (Cal. 1985); People v. Gomez, E056133, 2013 WL 6797764, at *10 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2013); Davis v. State, 121 So. 3d 462, 474 (Fla. 2013); People v. 
Houseworth, 903 N.E.2d 1, 8–14 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); State v. McCarroll, No. 88AP-978, 
1989 WL 155215, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 1989). 
32 Giovanni A. Fava et al., The Missing Link Between Clinical States and Biomarkers 
in Mental Disorders, 83 PSYCHOTHERAPY & PSYCHOSOMATICS 136, 136 (2014). 
33 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 646 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5] (“The 
diagnostic approach used in this manual represents the categorical perspective that 
personality disorders are qualitatively distinct clinical syndromes.”); Thomas A. Widiger & 
Douglas B. Samuel, Diagnostic Categories or Dimensions? A Question for the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders—Fifth Edition, 114 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 
494, 494 (2005). 
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admissibility of psychological testimony as well as how the jury interprets these 
diagnoses, this is a crucial distinction. Unfortunately, “some experts have misled 
courts to believe falsely that the existence of a diagnostic label [in the DSM] 
somehow proves general acceptance of the existence of the described disorder,” 
when there is no such acceptance.34 Rather than representing psychological theories 
that are falsifiable, the “[DSM] is simply an agreed upon set of terms and 
descriptions—a catalog.”35 As two researchers put it, when explaining that the DSM 
contains labels and not valid theoretical constructs: “the word unicorn is in the 
dictionary and we all agree on the concept and description of a unicorn, but this 
surely does not document the existence of unicorns.”36 The same is true with 
diagnoses that appear in the DSM. 
Let us turn now to the contents of the catalog to better understand how it 
facilitates diagnosis. While there are too many diagnoses to unpack them all, an 
examination of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) reveals the subjective line-
drawing that is a necessary component of the DSM. The DSM diagnosis of PTSD 
contains eight criteria (A–H).37 In addition to persistent re-experiencing of the 
traumatic event, the patient must also meet at least one of several criteria related to 
stress, avoidance, functional deficits lasting at least one month that are not caused 
by drugs, as well as two criteria each related to negative mood and arousal 
alterations.38 While the criteria may seem meticulous, they are also arbitrary. Why 
are two criteria for arousal alterations required for a PTSD diagnosis, but only one 
criterion related to intrusiveness of the traumatic memories? And why is one month 
of symptoms required over two, six, or twelve? The answer is that the DSM, while 
modestly field-tested, is really just a helpful starting point for mental health 
professionals and by no means a sacred “bible” to be rigidly followed.  
The DSM does not reveal hidden truths about mental disorders based on 
empirical data. Rather, it captures the evolution of thinking on mental illness, 
incorporating current practices and responding to social values. Because the DSM 
has not changed much in its nosology since 1980, the DSM can be thought of as an 
evolving compendium of values and data based on precedent and something like 
stare decisis. In this way, it resembles the common law more than a statute. This 
metaphor is important, because just as judges can distinguish a controlling case 
                                                     
34 William M. Grove & R. Christopher Barden, Protecting the Integrity of the Legal 
System: The Admissibility of Testimony From Mental Health Experts Under Daubert/Kumho 
Analyses, 5 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 224, 230 (1999). Judges assume that because the 
DSM is the diagnostic manual approved by the American Psychiatric Association, it is 
“generally accepted” in the relevant scientific community, which is the alternative to 
Daubert’s test for admissibility of expert evidence. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 PTSD: National Center for PTSD: DSM-5 Criteria for PTSD, U.S. DEP’T OF 
VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/PTSD-overview/dsm5_criteria_ 
ptsd.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/238L-9RY2 (last visited Jan. 27, 2015). 
38 Id. 
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under the common law, so too can psychologists distinguish their patient’s set of 
symptoms from those technically required by the DSM. For policy reasons, 
psychologists also engage in DSM nullification; they choose not to adhere to the 
DSM if its rigid prescriptions fail to label their patient’s constellation of traits in the 
way they personally think is appropriate. 
The DSM evolves from version to version, but is deeply rooted in an account 
of mental illness that relies on self-reports of symptoms, rather than on etiology or 
cause.39 “It has been widely accepted that etiological diagnosis of medical illness is 
superior to syndromal (symptom-based) diagnosis.”40 However, there are currently 
no clinical lab tests that can be used by therapists to diagnose psychiatric disorders.41 
Describing the DSM as reliant on self-reports is not meant to disparage it. If valid 
and reliable biomarkers or causal explanations for mental illness do not exist, how 
else might illness be diagnosed, if not through self-reports and clinical observation? 
Should individuals be followed around with surveillance cameras, and then have 
their behavior assessed based upon the footage? Clinical observation and self-reports 
are currently the best methods available, but the limitations of these methods must 
be understood when the DSM is employed in forensic contexts.  
Psychiatrists and psychologists appreciate that the DSM is not a bible. It simply 
provides a diagnostic starting point and convenient set of labels and criteria for 
comparisons between clinics and patients. If a patient meets most of the criteria for 
bipolar disorder, but technically not enough criteria to be considered bipolar under 
the DSM, many psychologists would lose little sleep diagnosing this person with 
this disorder.42 There is nothing inherently magical, or diagnostically more valid, in 
a patient that has five, rather than six, of the listed DSM criteria.  
If you ask a mental health practitioner what she thinks of the idea that the DSM 
is considered by lawyers to be the “psychiatric bible,” you will likely be met with a 
befuddled face. The DSM is our bible?43 The fact that lawyers refer to the DSM as 
the psychiatric bible is evidence of excessive legal deference, especially given that 
                                                     
39 Sadler, supra note 26, at 15–17. 
40 Shaheen E. Lakhan et al., Biomarkers in Psychiatry: Drawbacks and Potential for 
Misuse, 3 INT’L. ARCHIVES MED. 1, 1 (2010). 
41 Izabela Sokolowska et al., The Potential for Biomarkers in Psychiatry: Focus on 
Proteomics, 122 J. NEURAL TRANSMISSION (ISSUE 1 SUPP.) 9, 9 (2015), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00702-013-1134-6, archived at http://perma.cc/9QBF-KFLB 
(“[T]here is still no biological diagnostic test available for any mental disorder.”); see 
Lakhan, supra note 40, at 1. 
42 The author had various personal conversations with psychiatrists such as Brent 
Kious, M.D., and Jan Terpstra, M.D., who expressed these concerns with the use of the term 
“psychiatric bible,” precisely because the DSM is just a “starting point” not an “ending point” 
for clinical diagnosis of mental illness. See also Frances, supra note 18 (criticizing many of 
the changes in DSM-5). 
43 Perhaps the DSM may be considered the psychiatric bible only in so far as the DSM 
labels are used for the holy grail of clinical practice: insurance reimbursement. See NAT’L 
ALLIANCE OF MENTAL ILLNESS, supra note 12, at 4–5 (citing the DSM as a common 
reference for defining covered conditions). 
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the medical profession itself is not so deferential to the manual, and given that the 
manual cautions specifically against use in forensic settings.44 
 
III.  SO WHY THEN IS THE LAW SO DEFERENTIAL TO THE DSM? 
 
Policymakers rely heavily on definitions of mental illness contained in the 
DSM when creating statutes, and judges dismiss psychological diagnoses that are 
not contained in the DSM.45 Apart from surveying policymakers and judges about 
the reasons for this, there seem to be at least three different reasons that can be 
deduced from the traditional goals of litigation, regulation, and punishment. The first 
reason finds its roots in the legal system’s desire for efficiency, the second in its 
acknowledgment of different institutional competencies, and the third in a deep 
distrust for the unobservable, or anything relying overtly on psychologists.  
First, the desire for efficiency is an obvious reason that lawyers came to rely so 
heavily on the DSM.46 Without the DSM, there is a concern that judges would spend 
too much time trying to decipher whether someone’s mental illness is real or 
imagined. Given that most biological functions exist on a continuum, some believe 
that without the appearance of objectivity that the DSM provides, it would be 
administratively impossible to distinguish those who are truly mentally disordered 
from those who are merely a tad below average. Using psychiatric diagnosis, as 
interpreted through the lens of the DSM, provides clear, if arbitrary, cut-off points 
for when someone is considered legitimately mentally disordered. This would no 
doubt be very attractive to judges, who need a principled basis for labeling one 
person mentally ill, perhaps even legally insane based on a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, while labeling someone else merely low-functioning or simply 
criminal. 
                                                     
44 The DSM-5 contains a page-long “Cautionary Statement for Forensic Use of DSM-
5.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 33, at 25. The DSM-IV contained a similar, 
though shorter, warning. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 
OF MENTAL DISORDERS, at xxxii–xxxiii (4th ed. 1994). Though hardly representing the 
majority, there are fortunately examples of courts that have been responsible in heeding the 
advice of the American Psychiatric Association. See, e.g., State v. Horne, 679 So. 2d 953, 
961 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
45 Laura Freberg, How Should DSM-5 Be Used in Forensics?, ANSWERS, 
http://psych.answers.com/abnormal/how-should-dsm-5-be-used-in-forensics, archived at 
http://perma.cc/W5C8-EHJB (last visited Jan. 27, 2015); see also People v. Houseworth, 903 
N.E.2d 1, 13–14 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). There is one notable exception, where the Supreme 
Court allowed Arizona to prefer descriptions of mental illness rather than diagnostic labels 
in case where the defendant was claiming legal insanity. Commentators remarked that this 
was due to skepticism about the validity of all psychological testimony, as well as exhibiting 
concerns about the validity of DSM criteria. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 774 (2006). 
46 See Allen Frances et al., Defining Mental Disorder When It Really Counts: DSM-IV-
TR and SVP/SDP Statutes, 36 J AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 375, 375–84 (2008) 
(discussing the difficulty in drawing “bright-line” rules between mentally ill and criminal 
definitions). 
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The second reason that lawyers came to rely so heavily on the DSM is an 
acknowledgment of institutional competencies. While the DSM might not be 
considered a “bible” to the psychotherapist community, it still designates the best 
working labels for the symptoms of mental illness, as defined by the American 
Psychiatric Association. It seems like a very tall order to impose upon generalist 
lawyers the requirement that they second-guess the authority of the DSM, which, 
after all, is published (for-profit) by a well-respected arm of the psychiatric 
profession. But this is the job of the trial judge, in the federal courts and state courts 
that follow Daubert.47 Following Daubert, only expert testimony that is based on 
sound, reliable, and testable scientific methods should be admitted. While the DSM 
diagnoses are not themselves testable theories, the nosology upon which they rest 
and the inter-rater reliability of the classification system itself should be subjected 
to the rules of evidence pertaining to expert testimony. Conclusions, or diagnoses, 
that have no sound basis in scientific methodology should not be admitted.48  
Unfortunately, when judges fail to properly evaluate the admissibility of 
psychological theories, advocates relying on the DSM are allowed to conflate the 
goals of clinical treatment with the goals of the legal system. In a clinical setting, 
the cost of providing an incorrect diagnosis may be trivial. The patient may have to 
experience the side effects of an ineffective drug, or spend a month working on 
cognitive strategies that may or may not work. But the cost of getting it wrong in the 
legal system may be much more consequential. When inferences are drawn about 
individuals based on group data in capital cases, there is a risk of yielding false 
negatives that might lead to someone’s death, or at the very least may make them 
ineligible for certain government benefits. False positives, on the other hand, may 
result in a mother losing custody of her children or someone being civilly committed. 
Clearly, the risks of getting it wrong are not symmetrical in the clinical and legal 
settings. Such a small group of psychiatrists should not be excessively deferred to 
when deciding whether the legal costs of false positives and false negatives are worth 
it.  
The third related reason legal processes defer so much to the DSM is that in 
addition to the difficulty differentiating true mental illness from normal behavior, 
one cannot see mental illness. It is not measurable and observable in the same way 
crime scene DNA, security camera footage, or telephone records are. Christopher 
Slobogin has noted the difficulty in determining whether someone has a relevant 
mental disorder, and has referred to this pursuit as an effort to “prove the 
                                                     
47 Grove & Barden, supra note 34, at 226. 
48 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“[C]onclusions and methodology 
are not entirely distinct from one another. Trained experts commonly extrapolate from 
existing data. But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a 
district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse 
dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap 
between the data and the opinion proffered.”). 
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unproveable.”49 People rarely “look crazy,” even though the public has demanded 
that a mentally ill defendant comport with its visual images of “craziness.”50 
Because self-reports of mental illness are notoriously unreliable, lawyers, 
judges, and policymakers have been tantalized by the idea of bypassing self-reports, 
to look directly at biomarkers, or measurable biological indicators, of mental illness. 
The last century was riddled with examples of premature attempts to prove mental 
illness through the contours (phrenology) or images (brain scans) of a litigant’s 
brain, or through an assessment of his genes (Fragile X syndrome and the MAOA 
allele).51 We are desperate for a biological test for mental illness that does not rely 
on the credibility of the person testifying.  
The desire for objectivity and direct observation of mental illness is intriguing. 
Why are we so wary of the self-described default functioning of someone’s mind, 
as opposed to what someone says she saw, heard, or remembered? Is not this latter 
type of testimony, common and unscientific, also the product of mental processes 
that cannot be directly observed?  
While there are certainly reasons to be skeptical of eyewitness testimony, we 
somehow intuitively feel that a lay jury can ferret out liars through observing the 
witness’s mannerisms on the stand. We are confident in our human capacity to read 
people in this way, even though studies show we are no better than a coin toss at 
detecting lies.52 If we place so much faith in the jury’s ability to assess a witness’s 
veracity, despite the evidence that we are not good at it, then why do we not trust 
the trial system to also ferret out psychological malingerers, acknowledging that we 
might not be very good at that either? There seems to be something unique about the 
public’s distrust of people, usually defendants, who claim to be mentally ill. There 
also seems to be something unique about testimony that is relayed through expert 
psychologists or psychiatrists.  
The skepticism toward psychological science manifests in paradoxical ways: 
judges and evidence scholars worry juries may give therapists’ testimony too much 
                                                     
49 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW, SCIENCE, 
AND SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS 64–66 (2007). 
50 Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity 
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 724–25 (1990). 
51 See Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional 
Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
1119, 1122 (2010); see also Erica Beecher-Monas, Circumventing Daubert in the Gene Pool, 
43 TULSA L. REV. 241, 241–42 (2007) (explaining courts’ skepticism of the use of genetic 
testing may be due in part to the “long shadow cast by the eugenics movements and 
eugenistists’ racial biases”); William Bernet et al., Bad Nature, Bad Nurture, and Testimony 
Regarding MAOA and SLC6A4 Genotyping at Murder Trials, 52 J. FORENSIC SCIENCE 
1362, 1362 (2007) (explaining that “[e]arly attempts to explain criminal behavior on the basis 
of inherited genetic predisposition focused on phenotype rather than genotype”). 
52 Aldert Vrij & Simon Easton, Fact or Fiction? Verbal and Behavioural Clues to 
Detect Deception, 70 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 29, 29 (2002). 
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weight,53 but in reality judges (and jurors) do not give this testimony much weight 
at all.54 If it is true that jurors are skeptical of psychological science and expert 
testimony, then it would seem that there is not much harm in allowing them to hear 
about patterns of symptoms and the testimony of family and friends, as opposed to 
requiring that those symptoms coalesce around a predetermined label.55 Why not 
endorse a plurality of methods and diagnoses, rather than relying nearly exclusively 
on the DSM? The question is a tricky one, and not one that lends itself to pithy 
answers.56 Ultimately, however, it comes back to mistrust to things that are often 
associated with psychologists, and the “soft sciences.”57  
We do not trust the personal injury plaintiff who claims she suffers from PTSD 
and anxiety. We do not trust the father who accuses the mother of being bipolar and 
narcissistic, so that he can have sole custody of their children. We do not trust the 
                                                     
53 “[I]n Clark v. Arizona, the Supreme Court . . . held that Arizona’s rule prohibiting 
consideration of evidence of mental illness in determining the presence of the requisite mens 
rea did not violate due process. In doing so, the Court advanced thin countervailing concerns 
that ultimately are insufficient to outweigh defendants’ due process rights, revealing a deep 
skepticism of contemporary psychiatry.” Leading Cases–Required Scope of Insanity 
Defense, 120 HARV. L. REV. 125, 223 (2006) [hereinafter Leading Cases]. 
54 See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital 
Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1124–43 (1997); see also 
Goodman, supra note 30, at 721–22 (“[T]he judiciary has been highly skeptical of the 
psychiatrists upon whom it must rely . . . ‘given the lack of certainty and the fallibility of 
psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as to whether a state could ever prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous.’ 
. . . Indeed, the Court was of the opinion that the ‘subtleties and nuances of psychiatric 
diagnosis’ usually render accurate diagnosis an illusory goal.”) (citation omitted); Leading 
Cases, supra note 53, at 231 (“[N]either Arizona nor the Court has reason to fear that jurors 
will rely excessively on expert psychiatric opinion. Post-trial surveys of jurors reveal, if 
anything, greater—or at least more candid—skepticism of expert psychiatric testimony than 
that exhibited by the Clark Court.”).  
55 There is evidence that expert testimony on mental illness is most powerful when 
combined with narratives from lay witnesses such as family and friends. See Sundby, supra 
note 54, at 1135, 1163–64. 
56 Our reluctance to entertain mental illness as a cause of behavior may stem from vague 
notions of Cartesian dualism, or the idea that the body is separate from mind. The law cares 
about the body, and is suspicious of those who are seeking to “get off” by pointing to 
something errant in their brains. See Denno, supra note 5, at 1593 (warning of fears that 
defendants may be “let off the hook” due to predispositions). 
57 See Leading Cases, supra note 53, at 231–32 (2006) (“[T]here is something 
inherently tenuous about psychiatry that makes evidence concerning it, as opposed to other 
scientific disciplines, per se excludable as unreliable.”). As mentioned above, this is in 
contrast to the acceptance of so many types of psychological testimony that are not perceived 
as “psychological.” For example, witnesses may also malinger about their experience of 
grief, pain, or remorse, and yet we do not require psychological experts to validate these 
claims. These are often taken, unexamined, as reliable and valid, and not even viewed as 
“psychological” evidence. 
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woman seeking social security benefits based on her paranoia or severe depression. 
In these types of cases, we do not trust that through someone’s testimony alone, and 
its cross-examination, we will be able to access the truth.58 And yet, we are 
confronted with a legal system where jurors and judges are routinely expected to be 
able to engage in “theory of mind” and determine the sincerity of others’ claims.59  
There are no doubt other reasons that the law has been so deferential to the 
DSM. But efficiency, institutional competence, and the fear of malingering seem to 
be the three most prominent. These three reasons are powerful justifications for 
endorsing the DSM. These concerns of efficiency, institutional competence, and the 
fear of malingering do not disappear if a diagnostic system like the RDoC, that 
focuses instead on neurobiology and genetics, is endorsed.  
Despite the lack of validity in the DSM diagnoses, it would be misguided to 
abandon their use completely in forensic contexts. However, judges and lawyers 
should recognize three things about the DSM. The first is that there are many real 
phenomena that do not make their way into the DSM. Second, there are also many 
diagnoses that are in the DSM, which may be little more than a “diagnostic fad.” 
Third, mental illness, like most biological phenomenon, exists on a spectrum. Most 
of us have disordered thoughts or emotions to some degree, and these symptoms 
might wax and wane in parallel with other stressors in our lives. Mental illness is 
not binary; it is not cleanly present or absent. Once these three important caveats of 
the DSM have been factored in, there is still a place for the DSM in trials, statutes, 
and regulations. Rather than dismissing the testimony of a party or expert because 
what they describe is not in the DSM, the judge ought to serve as the evidentiary 
gate-keeper based on general principles of reliability and validity, and then let the 
fact-finder decide whether to give any weight to the testimony. This is not a 
controversial idea; this is precisely what many judges are already required to do. In 
legislative settings, policymakers need to think critically about why inclusion in the 
DSM might be required, and when requiring a DSM diagnosis might undercut 
justice. 
 
                                                     
58 Despite the fact that opposing experts disagree all of the time on subjects such as 
causation and breach in torts, there is something particularly unsettling about two 
psychologists who disagree about whether the criminal defendant is “insane.” This is despite 
the fact that “insanity” is a legal construct, not a medical one, so it is not surprising that 
psychologists waffle when using legal, rather than clinical, terms. Even so, high profile cases 
where the experts disagree seem to fuel the general skepticism toward psychological expert 
testimony. See Perlin, supra note 50, at 652–53. 
59“[Theory of mind], or mentalizing, is the ability to consider the mental states of others, 
and recognize that not only are they different from yours, but in fact they might be in conflict 
with the individual’s overt speech or behavior (i.e., she might be lying). . . . Theory of mind 
is crucial for making all kinds of credibility determinations. Specifically, determining 
‘culpability and liability frequently requires inferences about the motives, goals, intentions, 
and emotions of the actors involved.’” Teneille R. Brown, The Affective Blindness of 
Evidence Law, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 47, 94–95 (2011) (citation omitted). 
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IV.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE DSM: THE EVOLUTION OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRIC 
DIAGNOSIS AND HOW IT BECAME A POOR MIRROR OF NATURE 
 
In order to understand and then critique the over-reliance by lawyers on the 
DSM, it is important to know more about how the DSM has developed and how it 
is intended to be used. In the United States, the initial classification system for 
mental disorders was created so that the government could collect census 
information.60 The DSM I and DSM II followed, and were largely glossaries 
describing a few existing mental disorders, tracking the World Health 
Organization’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD).61 These two first 
DSMs were not widely accepted clinically, as they were still largely tools for 
gathering population health statistics.62 Then came DSM-III, which was 
revolutionary. The DSM-III “was driven by a medical model that saw psychiatric 
disorders as closely analogous to physical diseases.”63 The DSM-III aligned the 
goals of psychiatry with the rest of medicine, and became an important clinical tool 
for diagnosing mental illness. It included explicit diagnostic criteria, a multi-axial 
system that separated out different root kinds of disorders (personality, clinical, 
neurobiological, cultural), and “a descriptive approach that attempted to be neutral 
with respect to [causal] theories . . . .”64 It relied mostly on self-reports by patients 
as to the symptoms they were experiencing. As with any document, over time, the 
DSM-III proved to contain ambiguous definitions and criteria.65 The DSM-IV was 
thus published in 1994, employing empirical data to validate the existing DSM 
diagnoses, reshuffle categories of disorders, and create a few new diagnoses. 
Because the DSM-IV was built upon the foundations of DSM-III, it perpetuated 
some of its perceived classification problems, such as the reliance on self-reported 
symptoms rather than biomarkers, lab tests, or causes.  
It became increasingly apparent to researchers, and to a lesser extent to 
clinicians, that because the DSM was agnostic as to biological and environmental 
                                                     
60 See DSM: History of the Manual, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.psychiatry. 
org/practice/dsm/dsm-history-of-the-manual, archived at http://perma.cc/KD8X-8N2B (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2015) (“What might be considered the first official attempt to gather 
information about mental health in the United States was the recording of the frequency of 
‘idiocy/insanity’ in the 1840 census.”). 
61 Id. 
62 See Sadler, supra note 26, at 4–5 (tracing the history through each edition of the DSM 
and explaining that “the DSM-III committee wished to make diagnosis more reliable, and 
ultimately more valid”); see also Kirmayer & Crafa, supra note 23, at 2 (explaining the 
improvements that came from material changes to the DSM-III). 
63 Kirmayer & Crafa, supra note 23, at 2. 
64 Woo-kyoung Ahn & Nancy S. Kim, The Effect of Causal Theories on Mental 
Disorder Diagnosis 4–5 (Sep. 10, 2007), available at http://www.yale.edu/thinkinglab/ 
papers/AhnKim2005.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9H7N-TP55 (quoting the DSM-IV and 
stating that later editions of the DSM took a more “theory-neutral approach”); see also 
Kirmayer & Crafa, supra note 23, at 2–3. 
65 See Kirmayer & Crafa, supra note 23, at 2–3. 
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causes, it was not capturing valid and discrete diagnoses.66 As one researcher put it, 
the DSM relied upon “overly heterogeneous or spurious categories that do not have 
single, simple neurobiological mechanisms.”67 Translation: the diagnoses were not 
capturing truly different types and causes of behavior. As the former head of the 
National Institutes of Mental Health (NIMH), Steven Hyman said, “it was clear that 
DSM was a poor mirror of nature.”68 By way of illustration, Hyman noted that the 
DSM-IV diagnosis of major depression required that a patient have at least five of 
nine possible symptoms. Given this diagnostic scenario, it would be possible for two 
people to receive the same diagnosis while only sharing one symptom in common. 
As Hyman described it, “[t]heir inner turmoil and its biological roots might differ 
substantially, but they could easily be lumped together in a study on ‘major 
depression.’”69 There was also a problem with terminology. Terms that are routinely 
used in clinical practice, and embodied in the DSM, such as “neuroticism,” 
“extraversion,” or even “depression,” do not represent “meaningful, cohesive 
psychological constructs; rather, they represent combinations of constructs.”70 These 
imprecise terms were capturing lots of different moods and traits, and moods and 
traits that exist on a spectrum.  
Treatments also proved to be far less specific when DSM diagnoses were used. 
Specifically, antidepressants are prescribed for panic disorder, anxiety, obsessive-
compulsive disorder, and many other conditions.71 These broad off-label uses follow 
marketing efforts by pharmaceutical companies to extend (and over-extend) 
medications to new conditions, but it also suggests that the shared “therapeutic 
efficacy of medications reflects their effects on common pathways.”72 Put another 
way, the drugs might operate well in two very different DSM disorders because the 
disorders in fact share a common biological cause.73 Combined, these findings led 
researchers to believe that new treatments for mental illness were stalling because 
the DSM categories were artificial: illnesses were separated that should be compared 
                                                     
66 See id. at 2–3. 
67 Id. at 3. 
68 Greg Miller, Beyond DSM: Seeking a Brain-Based Classification of Mental Illness, 
327 SCIENCE 1437, 1437 (2010). 
69 Id. 
70 Bruce N. Cuthbert, The RDoC Framework: Facilitating Transition from ICD/DSM 
to Dimensional Approaches That Integrate Neuroscience and Psychopathology, 13 WORLD 
PSYCHIATRY 28, 28 (2014) (citation omitted). 
71 See Letizia Bossini et al., Off-Label Uses of Trazodone: A Review, 13 EXPERT 
OPINION PHARMACOTHERAPY 1707, 1707–08 (2012); Graham Mellsop et al., Releasing 
Psychiatry from the Constraints of Categorical Diagnosis, 15 AUSTRALASIAN PSYCHIATRY 
3, 3 (2007). 
72 Kirmayer & Crafa, supra note 23, at 3. 
73 For example, data on depression and anxiety suggest that mutations in the D2 
receptor in the brain, or reward system, can lead to various psychiatric disorders, depending 
on the genetic variant and environmental factors. See Ernest P. Noble, D2 Dopamine 
Receptor Gene in Psychiatric and Neurologic Disorders and Its Phenotypes, 116 AM. J. 
MED. GENETICS 103, 103–04 (2003). 
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to each other, and things were lumped together that perhaps should be researched 
separately.  
 
V.  THE FUTURE OF PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS: THE NEED TO UNDERSTAND 
BIOLOGICAL CAUSES 
 
What this all pointed to was the need to classify mental illness according to its 
underlying neuroscientific or genetic cause. There is a mantra in scientific research: 
if you can describe causal mechanism, you can prescribe better treatment. If the 
cause is a genetic mutation on a particular receptor in the brain, target that receptor’s 
dysfunction through chemicals. If the cause is an error in the stimulation of brain 
regions responsible for glutamate processing, stimulate those areas. But the DSM 
was organized to be agnostic to cause, and this was the essential problem with the 
validity of the psychiatric research that stemmed from using the DSM.  
There was great excitement when the American Psychiatric Association began 
discussing revisions, with an eye toward the DSM-5. Many hoped the DSM-5 would 
herald a new type of psychiatric diagnosis that relied on the neurobiology and 
genetics revolution of the 1990s and 2000s.74 After all, the human genome project 
and the “Decade of the Brain”75 should have resulted in much better data on the 
biological causes of mental illness. The time had come to move toward notions of 
mental illness that were no longer agnostic to cause.  
Unfortunately, the final DSM-5 includes very little by way of biological cause. 
The DSM-5 continues to be based on self-reported symptoms, rather than causes, 
because there is still just too little known about the biological basis of most mental 
illness.76 The problem “is a failure of our neuroscience and biology to give us the 
level of diagnostic criteria, a level of sensitivity and specificity that we would be 
able to introduce into the diagnostic manual.”77 For example, neuregulin 1 represents 
a likely genetic biomarker for schizophrenia. Even so, the presence of this mutation 
accounts for only 1% of the increased risk of developing the symptoms.78 In this 
optimistic case for a “test” for mental illness, the biomarker is legally and clinically 
                                                     
74 Daivd J. Kupfer & Darrel A. Regier, Neuroscience, Clinical Evidence, and the Future 
of Psychiatric Classification in DSM-5, 168 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 672, 672 (2011). 
75 During the 1990s, the Library of Congress and the National Institute of Mental Health 
of the National Institutes of Health sponsored a unique interagency initiative to advance the 
goals set forth in a statement by President George Bush designating the 1990s as the Decade 
of the Brain: “‘to enhance public awareness of the benefits to be derived from brain research’ 
through ‘appropriate programs, ceremonies, and activities.’” Project on the Decade of the 
Brain, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/loc/brain/ (quoting Proclamation No. 
6158, 55 Fed. Reg. 29,553 (July 20, 1990)), archived at http://perma.cc/3CFR-KAH2 (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2015). 
76 See Miller, supra note 68, at 1437. 
77 Pam Belluck & Benedict Carey, Psychiatry’s New Guide Falls Short, Experts Say, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2013, at A13. 
78 Lakhan, supra note 40, at 2. 
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irrelevant, because the presence of neuregulin 1 only makes it a tiny bit more likely 
that someone will actually develop schizophrenia.  
At present, the data on neuroscience and genetics are just too preliminary. There 
are no examples of biomarkers that can predict the expression of a mental illness 
with anything resembling accuracy or reliability.79 In part, this is because researchers 
have a difficult time quantifying the impact of important environmental moderators. 
This is also because the inclusionary criteria for research rely on DSM diagnoses. 
Researchers need a better way to recruit subjects to studies that reflect what they 
have biologically in common. 
Enter the Research Domain Criteria (“RDoC”), a new research project 
developed at the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The RDoC represents a 
radically different way of classifying mental illness. Rather than labeling mental 
illness based on the symptoms someone experiences, as the DSM does, the RDoC 
seeks to define mental illness based upon underlying neurobiological and genetic 
causes, or their correlated biomarkers. It also embraces a dimensional approach to 
mental illness that assumes all cognitive, social, and emotional functions exist on a 
spectrum, with no magic boundaries between those labeled “disordered” and those 
labeled “normal”.  
The RDoC will use five domains that are present in everyone, but are correlated 
with mental illness only when expressed in extremes. For example, the RDoC 
recognizes that many feelings, such as fear, are not only helpful, but are 
evolutionarily adaptive.80 Everyone responds to fear differently, and on a continuum, 
with some people being fairly insensitive to fear (perhaps leading to risk-seeking 
and compulsion) and others being overly sensitive to fear (perhaps leading to severe 
anxiety or depression). In any case, the processing of fear can be explained at various 
levels of biological detail, starting with neurons, then leading to brain circuitry, brain 
regions, genetics and ultimately behavioral output.81 The NIH decided to begin with 
the five best validated functional domains with established neural circuits, and 
progress from there. These functional domain “starting points” are negative 
                                                     
79 See Cynthia H. Y. Fu & Sergi G. Costafreda, Neuroimaging-Based Biomarkers in 
Psychiatry: Clinical Opportunities of a Paradigm Shift, 58 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 499, 
499 (2013). 
80 See Philip L. Johnson et al., Etiology, Triggers and Neurochemical Circuits 
Associated with Unexpected, Expected, and Laboratory-Induced Panic Attacks, 46 
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 429, 430, 446–47 (2014); Robert F. Krueger et al., 
Challenges and Strategies in Helping the DSM Become More Dimensional and Empirically 
Based, 16 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REP. 515, 515 (2014). 
81 One critique of the RDoC is that the units of analysis may need to be refined. 
Circuitry as a unit of analysis has great variability. It can vary from detailed descriptions of 
single neuron recordings, DTI, through anatomical mapping of large white matter tracts, and 
even “box-and-arrow diagrams of information processes based on anatomical localization of 
activation during specific tasks.” See Kirmayer & Crafa, supra note 23, at 7. 
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emotionality (such as fear), positive emotionality, cognitive processes, social 
processes, and arousal/regulatory systems.82  
The current DSM diagnoses do not map on to the RDoC entries, and that is 
precisely the point.83 Instead of relying on self-reports and symptoms, the RDoC will 
ask: “‘[w]hat is the normal distribution for a certain trait or characteristic; what is 
the brain system that primarily implements this function; and, how can we 
understand, at various levels of mechanism, what accounts for the development of 
dysregulation or dysfunction in these systems along normal-to-abnormal 
dimensions?’”84 “The ultimate goal is to build a research literature that” provides 
“precision diagnosis” for the treatment of mental disorders, by reflecting advances 
in genetics, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience.85 
 
VI.  A CASE FOR CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM 
 
A.  The RDoC May Lead to More Precise Treatments 
 
The NIH set up a multi-study database (RDoCdb), which will contain subject-
level data from RDoC-sponsored research. This will make it easier to collect 
population data to help researchers identify biological causes that cut across 
traditional DSM diagnoses. If the research is successful, and yields new ways of 
categorizing mental disorders by cause, then in the future many more targeted and 
personalized treatments will likely emerge.  
Currently mental health workers employ a trial-and-error approach, where the 
patient and clinician work through various options over months or years to see what, 
if anything, works for them. The RDoC may eventually facilitate using the patient’s 
unique DNA or neurobiology to help the clinician narrow the potential treatments 
from the beginning. Put differently, by helping us understand what it is that mental 
illnesses share in common causally and biologically, the RDoC will be 
transformative in terms of treatment, or predictive validity. Mental health workers 
will be able to be much more precise in treatments, and target the specific treatments 
that operate on the particular patient’s disordered neurobiology.  
This could certainly improve efficiency in the legal system, if the treatments 
are cheap and not too invasive. For example, if the research leads to new, targeted 
drug therapies with few significant side-effects, people with mental illness who take 
effective medications might be released after serving their sentence, rather than 
being civilly committed. However, if the research leads to expensive surgeries or 
stimulation treatments that carry with them significant negative effects on arousal or 
cognition, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments would likely not allow these 
                                                     
82 Id. at 4. 
83 “Exactly the problem with the DSM disorders is that they’re very heterogeneous and 
may involve multiple brain systems,” Bruce Cuthbert, an NIMH psychophysiologist leading 
the RDoC effort, says. Miller, supra note 68, at 1437. 
84 Cuthbert, supra note 70, at 31 (citation omitted). 
85 Id. at 29. 
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treatments to be forced upon convicts (or those seeking entitlement benefits or 
custody of their children, for that matter).  
Of course, this optimism in the RDoC’s ability to improve our legal system 
presumes a rehabilitative theory of justice, which would be in line with most clinical 
health workers’ theories of how the legal system should operate.86 However, not all 
judges endorse a theory of punishment that puts treatment at the front and center. 
Given that judges can adopt whichever theory of justice or punishment that they 
wish, more precise treatment options will not reduce punishments in all cases. For 
example, until a treatment is state-funded and cheap, a predictive biomarker of 
mental illness might lead to greater reliance on incapacitation theories of 
punishment, where people with so-called “genes for violence” or “neurobiology of 
sexual deviance” are warehoused without many constitutional protections. 
 
B.  The Legal Field May Be Demanding Too Much Validity for Some Legal Uses 
 
Judges and lawyers need to be more nuanced in their application of the DSM 
to legal questions. While the DSM might be describing “unicorns” rather than valid 
and separate constructs, the main problem with its use is that lawyers view it as the 
psychiatric bible. This metaphor, and the thinking that underlies it, have perpetuated 
naïve deference to the DSM. But the DSM is still quite useful to the law, as it 
provides a way to label diverse sets of behavior, albeit in fairly crude ways.  
The descriptive validity that the DSM provides might be enough in some 
contexts. In the epistemological hierarchy of validity, descriptive validity sits just 
above face validity, and below prescriptive validity and construct validity.87 Face 
validity just asks whether the classification system makes sense and seems “on its 
face” to be valid. Here, one might ask whether someone who runs naked in a public 
parking lot while screaming God-fearing nonsense might be mentally ill. Does the 
label make sense on its face? Yes. It is the least demanding form of validity. An 
example of the use of face validity may be when a school needs some threshold 
indicator that a student is mentally ill in order for the state to pay for a screening 
exam. Merely asking, “does this child seem mentally ill?” may be enough for the 
state’s Department of Education to foot the bill. The cost of getting it wrong here is 
quite low, because the child would be thoroughly tested for educational, social, and 
                                                     
86 Remarkably, knowing about biomarkers may, in clinical contexts, lead to a 
dehumanized view of patients. A recent study in the Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences found that when mental health workers were told that their patients’ mental 
illnesses were biologically caused, they were less sympathetic with their patients. In the 
future, if the RDoC gains traction and supplements the DSM, this may undercut the 
rehabilitative commitment of clinicians. MATTHEW S. LEBOWITZ & WOO-KYOUNG AHN, 
EFFECTS OF BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR MENTAL DISORDERS ON CLINICIANS’ 
EMPATHY 1–5 (2014), available at http://www.ncmhr.org/downloads/effects-of-biological-
explanations.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M79G-5PQZ. 
87 See Laura D. Goodwin & Nancy L. Leech, The Meaning of Validity in the New 
Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing: Implications for Measurement 
Courses, 36 MEASUREMENT & EVALUATION COUNSELING & DEV. 181, 181–83 (2003). 
2015] FROM BIBLES TO BIOMARKERS 763 
psychological deficits before the school decides that the student ultimately deserves 
special state-funded accommodation. The face validity of a teacher’s determination 
that the student may be mentally ill is enough for these legal purposes. 
Moving up the “validity ladder,” next comes descriptive validity. It is a bit more 
demanding than face validity, but less exacting than prescriptive validity. 
Descriptive validity is what the DSM provides. It allows people to describe or 
classify phenomena in reliable ways. Here, if one simply wants to know how to label 
someone’s mental illness so that the public health authorities can track roughly how 
many people are affected with this set of behaviors, then the DSM’s descriptive 
validity is probably enough. The power that descriptive validity wields is in terms 
of reliable classifications or sorting of phenomena. 
The next and even more exacting form of validity is prescriptive validity. 
Prescriptive validity describes a system that allows us to consistently predict future 
outcomes. When a system possesses prescriptive validity, it allows one to ask 
whether the DSM will help to predict who will be affected, and who will respond to 
particular treatments. Predictive validity is the goal of clinical care, and also, 
importantly, rehabilitative justice. It is what the RDoC seeks to offer. If one is 
looking to determine which sentencing factors should be considered aggravating 
based on recidivism, then what is needed is predictive validity. If one wants to know 
whether a father is likely to respond well enough from treatment to return to work 
or take care of his children, again, predictive validity is needed. There is some 
predictive validity in DSM diagnoses, because the medical community has gathered 
additional information on the treatment outcomes for various diagnoses. However, 
if the understanding of the biological causes of mental illness were improved, the 
predictive validity would also be greatly improved. It would allow for a move from 
trial and error to “precision treatments.”  
The most exacting form of validity is construct validity. This form of validity 
asks whether one can truly know that something is real. Construct validity demands 
proof of the existence of a phenomenon as a discrete and unique thing. Under 
construct validity, it is not enough to see, describe, or predict something. Its 
existence must also be defended through reliable measurement. To make this 
hierarchy of validity concrete, the next section will offer an example outside of the 
world of mental illness, and then tie this back to the discussion of forensic 
psychology.  
Let us use the example of love. A person could be watching a film in a language 
she does not speak, and know that the two actors are supposed to be in love. This 
ability to interpret overt actions as “love” means that society’s common assessment 
of love satisfies face validity. Descriptive validity asks what the signs or symptoms 
are of love. For example, companionship, desire, fondness, lust, interest, sympathy, 
and longing for are the symptoms of love. If the relationship can be described in this 
way, it can be reliably said that the two people are likely in love. Predictive validity 
allows one to predict whether two people will fall in love, or what the future holds 
for two people in love. Here, in order to predict outcomes, one needs to know more 
about how to measure either love or things correlated with love. Predictive validity 
is about knowing causes and being able to extrapolate into the future. Construct 
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validity can be deeply philosophical, as it asks, what is love? Is it real? How can one 
demonstrate that it is a real and discrete emotion?  
Hopefully this example sheds some light on the various forms of validity that 
can be expected and then demanded from forensic psychology. If the DSM 
definitions are being used to say that someone is incompetent to stand trial, more 
than face validity in mental illness diagnosis is probably required. Moreover, more 
than descriptive validity is needed if the DSM diagnosis is to be used to civilly 
commit someone after they have served their sentence. But if, instead, the diagnosis 
is being used to just raise reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case, then perhaps 
descriptive validity is enough. Ultimately the type of validity that may be morally 
or legally required depends on how comfortable society is with false positives and 
negatives, and the consequences of the outcome. In many cases, it might be asking 
too much from psychology to expect it to demonstrate the RDoC’s aspirational 
prescriptive validity before it is given weight by regulators, legislatures, judges, and 
juries.  
 
C.  The RDoC Might Improve Some Things, But Cannot Fix Major Problems with 
Forensic Psychiatric Diagnosis 
 
If research stemming from the RDoC provides for precision diagnosis and 
treatment that is cheaper and more effective, then the use of biomarkers might 
greatly improve legal efficiency. For example, a recent neuroimaging study found 
that brain activation patterns could much better predict a psychopath’s likelihood of 
recidivating than behavioral data alone.88 This is an example of biomarkers being 
used to increase predictive validity. Psychological testing can be time-consuming 
and quite expensive. Eventually the cost of imaging will be low enough that a few 
hours in a brain scanner could be cheaper and more effective than a traditional 
psychological battery.  
However, reducing the economic cost of diagnosis only improves one kind of 
efficiency. There is another type of efficiency—administrative costs—which may 
be worsened by the RDoC. Namely, judges would have to listen to all evidence and 
decide whether someone’s behavior classifies as disordered enough to receive social 
security or disability benefits, insurance coverage, a reduced sentence, or custody of 
their child. Judges could no longer rely on binary DSM diagnoses that are either 
present or not, but would have to see how an individual fits on a spectrum from 
normal to extremely disordered. This is not all that different from other types of 
evidence, in that most biological processes are not binary. Even so, it would mark a 
departure from being able to rely on an expert psychiatrist to rule that someone is 
either schizophrenic, or not, or suffering from anxiety disorder, or not. Under the 
                                                     
88 Eyal Aharoni et al., Neuropreditction of Future Rearrest, 110 PNAS 6223, 6224 
(2013), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/110/15/6223.full.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/5CKF-3K82. 
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RDoC, there would no longer be a bright line between what is considered normal, 
and what is not.  
Even for the researchers who will employ the RDoC, studies will still need a 
control group of “normals” in order to evaluate mechanisms of normal function 
along a particular dimension.89 This means that despite the RDoC’s commitment to 
studying mental disorders on a spectrum that mirrors its presentation in the 
population, the studies themselves will be question-begging in terms of defining 
what counts as normal. They will also need to do what judges struggle with, which 
is draw a line between those who are below average in a particular domain, and those 
who are impaired enough to be considered “disordered.” Thus, the RDoC method 
will likely work better if researchers start with severe dysfunction that is less variable 
and dependent on culture and context, such as schizophrenia. Eventually, however, 
the RDoC will have to grapple with significant environmental and cultural 
moderators, given that most mental illness shows substantial individual, cultural, 
and contextual variation.  
Another problem with the idea of using a continuum of functioning to diagnose 
mental illness is that some truly pathological states might not represent a point on a 
continuum of normal-to-abnormal functioning. Put differently, some mental 
illnesses might not reflect symptoms of behavior that we all exhibit. Instead, they 
might involve circuits that are unique in kind, circuits that are turned on from unique 
learning or developmental histories. Thus, looking to normal continuums of 
functioning will not reveal mechanisms of pathology in some cases.90  
Of course, for some time it is likely that the DSM will persevere. Even if the 
RDoC becomes admissible as a form of measuring mental disorders, it is likely it 
will not replace the DSM, but would rather supplement it. Having options besides 
the DSM for mental illness diagnosis would greatly improve the way the law comes 
to think about the admissibility of expert testimony. It would be easier to disabuse 
judges of the idea that the DSM is the psychiatric bible, if there is another system 
that also satisfies the two basic tests for admissibility of expert testimony, and offers 
greater predictive validity. Namely, if the RDoC became the benchmark for 
psychiatric diagnosis it would then satisfy the Frye standard, which requires that the 
evidence be “‘generally accepted’ by the relevant scientific community”,91 and 
would present an even more “reliable and valid” system for classifying mental 
illness, which is what is required under the Daubert standard.  
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
What the RDoC will not do is rid us of the concern that people are malingering. 
There will always be the potential for malingering, as individuals may have the 
                                                     
89 See Kirmayer & Crafa, supra note 23, at 5. 
90 See id. at 6. 
91 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 584–92 (1993) (citing Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129–1130 (9th Cir. 1991) (superseding the 
rule stated Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)). 
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biomarker and will never exhibit the disorder, and others will not have the biomarker 
and yet will ultimately develop it. This will be the case until biomarkers can account 
for a large percentage (near 100%) of the variance between those who are disordered 
and those who are not.  
There are two big reasons biomarkers will struggle to predict whether someone 
actually has or will develop a disorder. The first is the strong interaction between 
genetic and environmental causes. Most complex behaviors are caused both by 
mutated genes as well as the impact that environmental and social factors have on 
these genes. Without some reliable way of controlling or measuring significant 
differences in individuals’ environments, it will be impossible to say whether many 
disorders will manifest.  
It is quite unlikely that a biomarker would have high enough positive predictive 
value to determine the presence of mental illness given that good population data on 
the baserates of various mental illnesses does not exist. Baserates identify how many 
people in the underlying population are affected, and the baserate of a disorder must 
be known before anything can be said about how precise and accurate the biomarkers 
are at detecting the disorder. The existing data on mental illness baserates would be 
complicated by the new RDoC’s diagnostic system, which relies on a continuum of 
functioning rather than a bright line between disordered and normal.  
There is great anticipation for the RDoC’s neurobiological approach to mental 
illness to replace the DSM and make everything from research funding to insurance 
coverage more fair. Whether or not the legal applications of this new system will 
indeed be an improvement on the DSM depends greatly on how it is used, and what 
the normative commitments are in that particular legal domain. While the DSM 
provides one important and useful perspective on what counts as mentally 
disordered, ultimately for the law this is not a question that science or data can 
answer. Societies, comprised of people, must grapple with a normative account of 
when to treat, when to pardon, and when to punish. The DSM cannot decide these 
questions for us, tempting as it may be to defer to its diagnostic criteria. That we 
expect it to reveals a deep insecurity about the legal system’s ability to defend its 
methods and theories of punishment. 
